

## Message Text

SECRET

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ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 /026 W

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P R 190803Z MAR 75

FM AMEMBASSY ANKARA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8442

INFO AMEMBASSY ATHENS

AMEMBASSY NICOSIA

S E C R E T ANKARA 2207

EXDIS

DEPARTMENT PASS SECRETARY'S PARTY PRIORITY

FOR THE SECRETARY FROM AMBASSADOR

EO 11652 GDS

TAGS: PFOR, CY, TU, US

SUBJECT: NEXT STEPS IN CYPRUS

1. IT IS NOW ONE WEEK SINCE YOU COMPLETED YOUR VISIT TO ANKARA. OUR ASSESSMENT IS THAT YOU MADE PROGRESS WITH RESPECT TO YOUR OBJECTIVE OF CONVINCING THE BROAD MIDDLE SPECTRUM OF TURKISH LEADERSHIP THAT THERE EXISTS IN ATHENS AN INTEREST IN DEALING WITH THE CYPRUS SITUATION ON AN URGENT BASIS, AND THAT THIS OPPORTUNITY SHOULD NOT BE LOST. THERE ARE SOME HERE WHO REMAIN CYNICAL AS TO WHETHER THE GREEKS REALLY WANT A PROMPT DEAL BUT AT LEAST A NUMBER OF THESE AGREE THAT GREEK INTENTIONS SHOULD BE PROMPTLY TESTED. THUS WE CONCLUDE THAT THE MAINSTREAM OF THE TURKISH LEADERSHIP IS IMPRESSED WITH (IF NOT TOTALLY PERSUADED BY) YOUR ARGUMENT FOR GETTING MEANINGFUL NEGOTIATIONS GOING AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE -- PROVIDED: (A) "THE THORNY PROBLEM OF MAKARIOS" (TO USE PRESIDENT KORUTURK'S PHRASE) CAN BE HANDLED; (B) CONCRETE STEPS TOWARD RESTORING US MILITARY ASSISTANCE CAN BE TAKEN IN CONGRESS; AND (C) THE PROBLEM OF WEAK GOVERNMENT IN ANKARA CAN SOMEHOW BE SURMOUNTED.

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2. THERE HAVE BEEN TWO OTHER SCHOOLS OF THOUGHT OPERATIVE SINCE YOUR VISIT. THE FIRST PROCLAIMS THAT YOU HAVE BEEN CLEARLY TAKEN IN BY THE GREEKS AND THAT ATHENS HAS NO INTENTION OF NEGOTIATING AN EARLY AND ACCEPTABLE SETTLEMENT WITH TURKEY. THE SECOND SCHOOL OF THOUGHT IS THAT BY YOUR URGING AN EARLY SETTLEMENT, YOU ARE DOING THE GREEKS' WORK FOR THEM. THIS GROUP BELIEVES THAT WITH THE TURKISH POSITION STAKED OUT AS IT IS ON THE ISLAND, AND WITH NO SERIOUS MILITARY CHALLENGE IN SIGHT, TIME IS ON THE TURKISH SIDE AND THAT BOTH THE GREEKS AND THE GREEK CYPRIOTS WILL SOONER OR LATER COME TO ACCEPT THE INEVITABLE.

3. THE PRESENT TURKISH DOMESTIC POLITICAL CRISIS IS EXACTLY SIX MONTHS OLD AS OF TODAY. THE PRESIDENT IS MAKING ANOTHER OF HIS SEEMINGLY ENDLESS ATTEMPTS WITH THE POLITICAL LEADERS TO RESOLVE IT. AS BEFORE, WE HEAR EXPRESSIONS OF HOPE FOR A RELATIVELY EARLY SOLUTION WITHIN PURELY CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITS. THE TURKS AND THEIR MILITARY CONTINUE TO CONGRATULATE THEMSELVES ON THEIR PATIENCE -- WHICH HAS BEEN SHOWN TO A REMARKABLE DEGREE UP TO THIS POINT BUT WHICH IS NEVERTHELESS NOT ENDLESS. TODAY, THE FORMULA DEEMED MOST LIKELY TO SUCCEED IS A GOVERNMENT FORMED BY THE MINORITY DEMOCRATIC PARTY PLUS TECHNOCRATS, SUPPORTED BY ECEVIT'S REPUBLICAN PEOPLES PARTY FROM OUTSIDE AND COMMITTED TO EARLY PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS. AS THE WEEK WEARS ON, THE COUNTRY WILL LEARN THE PROSPECTS FOR THIS PARTICULAR SOLUTION. BUT AS OF NOW, NOBODY KNOWS WHETHER THIS FORMULA WILL BE ACCEPTED OR WHETHER ANY WORKABLE ALTERNATIVE CAN BE FOUND. FOR WHAT IT IS WORTH, SENIOR FOREIGN OFFICE OFFICIALS SPECULATE THAT IF A DEMOCRATIC PARTY-TECHNOCRAT GOVERNMENT IS AGREED UPON ESENBEL IS LIKELY TO REMAIN AS FOREIGN MINISTER.

4. WHETHER OR NOT A GOVERNMENT WITH A PARLIAMENTARY MAJORITY MATERIALIZES IN THE DAYS AND WEEKS IMMEDIATELY AHEAD, WE THINK THAT IT MAKES SENSE TO ENCOURAGE A THREE-WAY CONSENSUS ON CYPRUS NEGOTIATIONS AMONG ECEVIT, DEMIREL, AND FONOFF/GENERAL STAFF AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE. REGARDLESS OF WHAT KIND OF GOVERNMENT MAY COME TO POWER IN THE IMMEDIATE FUTURE, THESE THREE WILL BE THE MAIN POWER

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FACTORS IN FOREIGN POLICY DECISIONS UNTIL ELECTIONS ARE HELD. WE SHOULD CONTINUE TO ENCOURAGE THIS CONSENSUS AS PER CAGLAYANGIL'S SUGGESTION (ANKARA'S 2064).

5. FINALLY AND SETTING ASIDE FOR THE MOMENT THE VARIOUS INHIBITIONS THAT ARE CURRENTLY OPERATING ON THE ANKARA SCENE (CONGRESSIONAL, MAKARIOS, AND WEAK GOVERNMENT), WE HAVE GIVEN MUCH THOUGHT TO THE FRAMEWORK/FORUM FOR GETTING

SERIOUS NEGOTIATIONS GOING AGAIN. WE HAVE CONSIDERED A NUMBER OF OPTIONS: (A) SHUTTLE DIPLOMACY BETWEEN ANKARA AND ATHENS BY YOU OR YOUR SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE; (B) RE-ACTIVATING LUNS AS A NEGOTIATOR BETWEEN THE TWO NATO ALLIES; (C) PRESSING FOR RESUMPTION OF CLERIDES-DENKTASH TALKS (PERHAPS LATER ON AUGMENTED BY GREEK AND TURKISH REPRESENTATIVES); AND (D) URGING EARLY DIRECT CONTACT BETWEEN THE GREEK AND TURKISH FOREIGN MINISTERS AND/OR THEIR REPRESENTATIVES.

6. WE WOULD OF COURSE BE MOST INTERESTED IN THE VIEWS OF EMBASSIES ATHENS AND NICOSIA WITH RESPECT TO THESE COURSES OR OTHERS THEY MAY WISH TO SUGGEST. FROM OUR VANTAGE POINT HERE, HOWEVER, THE LATTER TWO OPTIONS, WHICH ARE NOT MUTUALLY EXCLUSIVE, WOULD SEEM TO BE PREFERABLE. WE WOULD FOCUS ON THE LAST OPTION IF OUR AND OTHER EFFORTS TO GET THE TALKS BETWEEN THE COMMUNITIES GOING IN A TIMELY AND MEANINGFUL WAY PROVE UNAVAILING.

7. BOTH GREECE AND TURKEY HAVE PUBLICLY ACCEPTED THE IDEA OF AN EARLY MEETING AT MINISTERIAL LEVEL ON AEGEAN PROBLEM. IF THE TWO PARTIES ARE WILLING TO HAVE FACE-TO-FACE DISCUSSIONS ON CYPRUS, THE AEGEAN MEETING COULD PROVIDE WHATEVER COVER THE PARTIES THINK THEY REQUIRE. AT THE SAME TIME WE RECOGNIZE THAT AN ESENBEL-BITSIOS DISCUSSION ON CYPRUS WILL NEED CONSIDERABLE PREPARATION IF IT IS TO RESULT IN PROGRESS. THE FIRST, AND PROBABLY MORE DESIREABLE, ALTERNATIVE FOR EFFECTING THESE PREPARATIONS WOULD BE TO ENCOURAGE BOTH SIDES TO SEND PRIVATE EMISSARIES TO EACH OTHER TO WORK OUT SUBSTANTIVE PRELIMINARIES FOR SUCH A MEETING. A SECOND, AND PROBABLY MORE REALISTIC, ALTERNATIVE WOULD BE FOR YOU TO CONTINUE YOUR ACTIVE DIALOGUE WITH BOTH PARTIES IN AN EFFORT TO BEGIN TO

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NARROW THE GAP TO THE POINT WHERE FACE-TO-FACE MEETINGS BETWEEN THEM WOULD BE PRODUCTIVE.

MACOMBER

NOTE BY OC/T: NOT PASSED SECRETARY'S PARTY.

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NNN

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